Mere Christianity (C.S. Lewis) 05 - Chapter 3. The Reality of the Law

Part 1. Right and Wrong as a Clue to the Meaning of the Universe

Chapter 3. The Reality of the Law

In Chapter 3 of Mere Christianity, titled "The Reality of the Law," C.S. Lewis argues for the objective reality of the Law of Human Nature (the Moral Law), demonstrating that it is neither a mere custom nor a personal feeling. He returns to the two facts mentioned in the first chapter—that humans know the law of how they ought to behave, yet they fail to actually live by it—to delve deeply into the meaning of this discrepancy.

Two Kinds of Laws

The core of the chapter begins with a clear distinction Lewis makes between two kinds of "laws." The first is the "Law of Nature," such as the law of gravity, which simply describes how things actually behave. This law offers no choice; a stone does not contemplate whether to "obey" gravity, it simply falls. Thus, such a law is merely another way of stating "what things always do."

"Of course, you can say that a stone is ‘the wrong shape’ if you want to use it for a rockery, or that a tree is a ‘bad’ tree because it doesn't give you as much shade as you expected. But what you mean is that the stone or the tree happens to be not convenient for your own purposes."

In contrast, the "Law of Human Nature" is of an entirely different character. It does not describe what humans "actually always do." On the contrary, its meaning is revealed precisely because we can, and often do, break it. Herein lies the unique quality of humanity. For everything else in the universe, only the "is"—the fact of what exists—is present. For humans, however, alongside that fact, something else intervenes: "something above and beyond the actual facts," namely, the "ought" of how we are supposed to be.

This distinction serves as the cornerstone of Lewis's argument. With it, he lays the foundation for his claim that the Moral Law is not a simple psychological phenomenon but a different kind of "reality" from physical laws.

Rebuttal to Counterarguments

Lewis raises and systematically refutes two major counterarguments that attempt to deny the reality of the Moral Law.

First is the claim that "right" and "wrong" are merely expressions of what is beneficial or inconvenient to oneself. Against this, Lewis offers the analogy of a train seat. Both the person who arrived first and took a seat and the person who secretly moved your bag to steal your seat are an inconvenience to you, yet we only condemn the latter. This shows that our standard of judgment is not simple convenience but lies on a deeper level of "fairness."

"Sometimes the behavior which I call bad is not inconvenient to me at all, but the very opposite. In war, each side may find a traitor on the other side very useful. But though they use him and reward him, they will inwardly regard him as a scum of the earth."

Second is the argument that moral behavior is followed because it is ultimately beneficial for the survival and happiness of humanity as a whole. Lewis points out that this is merely a circular argument.¹ To the question, "Why should I do something for the good of society at my own personal expense?" this argument can only ultimately answer, "Because you shouldn't be selfish." This is not an answer to the question but a repetition of the premise (the Moral Law) itself.

"It is a good rule, but it is not a progress in the argument. If you ask: ‘Why should I play football?’ the answer ‘to score goals’ is no good. Scoring goals is the game itself, not a reason for playing it."

Through these rebuttals, Lewis effectively blocks any attempt to reduce the Moral Law to subjective feelings or a social contract. One feels that his clear, everyday analogies compel the reader to acknowledge the validity of his claims in light of their own experience.

¹ A circular argument is a logical fallacy in which the conclusion is already assumed in the premises. Instead of providing independent evidence, the argument essentially repeats the claim in a different form, creating a closed loop of reasoning that fails to prove anything. It follows the pattern "X is true because of Y, and Y is true because of X." In the text, the argument "one should act morally for the good of society" is shown to be circular because the answer to the question "Why should I care about the good of society?" ultimately reverts to the original moral rule itself: "Because you shouldn't be selfish."

Conclusion

After responding to all counterarguments, Lewis arrives at his final conclusion. The Moral Law is not a physical fact, a personal taste, or a social invention. If so, only one possibility remains.

"Consequently, this Rule of Right and Wrong, or Law of Human Nature, or whatever you call it, must somehow or other be a real thing—a thing that is really there, not made up by ourselves."

This law is a different kind of "reality," one that we did not create, yet it pressures us. Through this chapter, Lewis demands that the reader broaden their definition of "fact." He asks us to acknowledge that beyond the visible, material reality, there exists a moral reality that appeals directly to our conscience. In doing so, he builds a solid foundation for the question of the next chapter: "Where does this real law come from?"

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